Syria: The Fall of Assad and the Dawn of a New Era

On December 8, the world was shaken by groundbreaking news: a coalition of Islamist groups announced the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad. The political opposition has formed a transitional government, which will take over the country’s administration until March 1. Analysts have described this as the most significant geopolitical shock in the country over the past 13 years, with the potential to radically shift the balance of power not only in Syria but across the entire Middle East.

The Syrian rebels launched their offensive on November 27. Within ten days, they had captured Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city, as well as the provinces of Idlib, Hama, and Homs. By the afternoon of December 7, militants claimed to be less than 20 kilometres from Damascus, and in the early hours of December 8, they announced their entry into the capital.

The militants seized the national radio and television building and addressed the citizens, declaring: "The city of Damascus has been liberated. The tyrant Bashar al-Assad has been overthrown. All prisoners have been freed from Damascus prison." Radical Islamist groups played a key role in Assad's overthrow. The most prominent among them was Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, recognised as a terrorist organisation in several countries. Its leader, Syrian national Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (born Ahmed al-Sharaa), started his career within the structures of al-Qaeda, the international Islamist terrorist organisation that for decades was considered the world's most prominent terrorist group. The coalition also included smaller rebel factions actively supported by Turkey, as well as Kurdish units. What united them was the common goal of removing Assad, but their interests and visions for Syria's future remain highly fragmented. Clashes have already been reported between rival factions in the north of the country. Meanwhile, the territory previously controlled by Assad's forces has become contested, with militias fighting for dominance.

The fall of Assad has not gone unnoticed by other countries. For Iran, it represents one of the most severe blows to its foreign policy in recent decades. Tehran had been one of the regime’s main allies throughout the Syrian civil war, viewing Syria as a strategically vital partner for advancing its regional ambitions and strengthening the so-called "axis of resistance" against the influence of the United States, Israel, and their allies. Iran’s military, economic, and diplomatic support was a key factor in enabling Assad’s regime to hold on during the war’s most critical moments. Iran provided Damascus with significant aid, including arms supplies, funding for military operations, and the involvement of Iranian military advisers and fighters. Additionally, Syria served as a crucial transit route for supplying Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which also played a central role in supporting Assad. For Iran, keeping Syria within its sphere of influence was a means of securing a geopolitical corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea.

The fall of Assad’s regime has left Iran in an extremely vulnerable position. Firstly, Iran has lost a key ally whose government long served as a stable pillar for advancing Tehran’s interests in the Middle East. With Assad’s departure, Iran’s influence in Syria is diminishing, dealing a major blow to its regional strategy. Secondly, the new Syrian leadership has already announced plans to reassess relations with Iran. For example, opposition representatives have stated that they are not interested in continuing cooperation with Tehran, including its military presence. According to some sources, no Iranian military personnel remain in Syria following Assad’s fall, which highlights a significant weakening of Tehran's position in the region. Thirdly, losing Syria undermines Iran's "axis of resistance," which also includes Hezbollah and pro-Iranian groups in Iraq. Without access to Syrian supply routes, delivering arms and financial support to these organisations becomes more difficult, weakening their operational capabilities. The consequences of Assad’s overthrow could have long-term implications for Iran, extending far beyond Syria itself. A weakened presence in Damascus will negatively impact Tehran’s influence in the Middle East as a whole. Furthermore, the success of the Syrian opposition could inspire other anti-government movements in countries where Iran wields influence.

For Russia, Assad’s fall delivers a similar setback. Moscow had been instrumental in propping up his regime since 2015, deploying military forces to Syria under the pretext of combating terrorism. Russian forces played a critical role in supporting the Syrian army, securing strategic victories such as the recapture of Aleppo and Palmyra. In return for its military assistance, the Syrian authorities leased Russia the Khmeimim Airbase and the Tartus naval facility for 49 years. These bases provided Moscow with a crucial foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, serving as hubs for deploying military contractors to and from Africa. Now, however, their future is uncertain. The new transitional government has already stated its intention to review all agreements with Russia, including military accords, to prioritise the interests of the Syrian people. Losing these bases could mean a significant setback for Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean, reducing its regional influence. It would also weaken Russia’s leverage in negotiations with the West, as the Syrian campaign was a key strategic card for Moscow. Turkey and Gulf states may emerge as the region’s new dominant players in Russia's absence. "If Russia leaves, others will fill the void, undermining its long-term strategy in the Middle East," noted a Middle East Institute analyst.

Turkey welcomed the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad as a strategic victory. Ankara has long supported the Syrian opposition, providing them with arms and training, and saw Assad as a source of instability and a threat to its interests. The change in power in Syria presents Turkey with an excellent opportunity to expand its influence in the region. Ankara will likely seek economic gains through the reconstruction of Syrian infrastructure and logistical projects. Restoring business and trade ties along the 900-kilometre border with Syria also promises significant benefits, according to Bloomberg. However, the shift in power also brings new challenges. Turkey is primarily concerned about the strengthening of Kurdish groups, which could use the situation to consolidate their positions in the region. The Syrian Democratic Forces, which control parts of northern Syria, are seen as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), with which Ankara has been in conflict since 1984. Additionally, Turkey faces the burden of managing another wave of refugees. Millions of Syrians have already fled to Turkey since the beginning of the conflict, and the fall of Assad, accompanied by new waves of violence, will only exacerbate this problem. The economic and social consequences of the migration crisis will remain a key challenge for Ankara.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states have taken a cautious stance regarding Assad’s downfall. In recent years, they had begun to restore diplomatic ties with Damascus, seeking to curb Iran’s influence in Syria. This normalisation process began in 2019 with the UAE reopening its embassy in Damascus, followed more recently by Saudi Arabia doing the same. While the fall of Assad has disrupted the Gulf’s strategic plans, their primary objective has been achieved: Iran’s “axis of resistance” has lost Syria. Additionally, this event may reduce the flow of Captagon, a drug that has been smuggled from Syria to Gulf countries for decades, causing significant concern. In the short term, the Sunni bloc in the region now has an opportunity to strengthen its position amid Iran’s decline. Among Gulf states, Qatar appears to be in the strongest position. Alongside Turkey, Qatar has actively supported Syrian rebels and opposed Assad’s regime. Now, it is consolidating its influence, serving as a key mediator between the international community and the leading rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Other Gulf states are also moving quickly. Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent envoys to Syria just two days after Assad’s fall, aiming to establish ties with the new government.

As for another key player in the region—Israel—its relationship with Bashar al-Assad's regime has always been complex and multifaceted. Formally in a state of war with Syria, Israel has avoided direct confrontations with Assad's army, preferring to maintain stability along its border and focus on its primary threats—Iran and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. Despite hostile rhetoric towards Israel, Bashar al-Assad has, in practice, maintained the status quo, avoiding escalation on the Golan Heights. However, the Syrian civil war has brought new challenges to the region. Iran, a key ally of Assad, has used Syrian territory as a staging ground to supply weapons to Hezbollah, posing a direct threat to Israel. In response, the Israeli military has carried out airstrikes on Iranian targets and weapon depots in Syria, showing its readiness to defend its interests.

The potential fall of Assad’s regime has created both new opportunities and risks for Israel. On one hand, the removal of Bashar al-Assad would weaken Iran's influence in Syria, which is a key goal of Israeli policy in the region. Without the support of the Syrian government, logistical routes for weapons shipments to Hezbollah would be disrupted, reducing the military potential of the group. On the other hand, the fall of Assad brings uncertainty. A new Syrian government, formed by the political opposition, is unlikely to immediately take control of the entire country. This could open opportunities for the strengthening of terrorist groups, including ISIS, which pose a direct threat to Israel’s security. Moreover, instability in the region could lead to new migration flows and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. One of Israel’s key tasks will be to maintain control over the buffer zone in the Golan Heights. This strategic area ensures the security of the country’s northern regions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already stated that Israel intends to continue controlling the buffer zone to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and maintain calm on its borders.

Economic factors also play an important role. The removal of Assad could complicate the extraction and transportation of oil in the Eastern Mediterranean. This, in turn, could hinder the implementation of Israeli energy projects in the region, such as the export of gas to Europe via Cyprus.

Syria enters a new chapter in its history amid economic collapse. Transitional government leader Mohammed al-Bashir has stated that the state treasury holds only Syrian pounds, which have plummeted in value to 35,000 per U.S. dollar on the informal market. International investment has ceased, and the country’s industries are in ruins. Before the civil war in 2011, Syria’s economy was stable, driven by agriculture, oil, and tourism. According to the World Bank, oil exports accounted for 25% of state revenue, and the Syrian pound was relatively stable. However, the war devastated the economy. Sanctions, destroyed infrastructure, and the loss of oil fields undermined its foundation. By 2023, oil production had fallen to less than 20% of pre-war levels, and inflation reached catastrophic levels. The fall of Assad has represented a turning point but has not brought immediate relief. Syria remains largely excluded from international trade, with exports nearly nonexistent. Reconstruction and stability will depend on resolving internal conflicts and establishing political order.

The coup in Syria has not only altered the balance of power in the Middle East but also poses new global challenges. In a country ravaged by economic devastation, conflict, and political instability, Syria remains the epicentre of global risks. The intertwining interests of regional and global players create a volatile and explosive situation, with Syria’s future and the stability of the entire Middle East hanging in the balance.