Afghanistan: The Qosh Tepa Canal and Rising Tensions in Central Asia

In 2023, the Qosh Tepa Canal was inaugurated in Afghanistan, constructed using rudimentary methods and without external assistance. Neighbouring countries, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, fear that this project will deplete the Amu Darya River, creating severe water shortages. Despite these concerns, the Taliban are unlikely to be swayed in their pursuit of this ambitious megaproject. The canal is crucial for Afghanistan's agriculture, providing much-needed jobs and improving irrigation, while also serving as a symbol of the Taliban's capacity for large-scale construction, thus holding significant political weight. However, regional tensions over reduced water flow may have contributed to the rise in military expenditures among Central Asian nations amid growing geopolitical tensions.

In the hot and arid climate of Central Asia, the construction of irrigation structures has traditionally been vital for the region's inhabitants. Over 3,000 years ago, the Persians began building "Qanats," enabling the Achaemenid Empire to develop agriculture successfully, which in turn allowed it to become one of the largest empires of its time. For modern Afghanistan, where 90% of the population relies on agriculture, access to water remains just as crucial. The restoration and modernisation of irrigation canals could potentially double the income of Afghan families.

The Qosh Tepa Canal project, initiated by the Taliban in 2022, aims to address Afghanistan's severe water shortages by diverting water from the Amu Darya River. This ambitious endeavour, spanning 285 kilometres, is planned to be completed in three phases by 2028. The Taliban's First Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, has emphasised that this project is a priority for his administration. The canal's significance is further underscored by the Taliban’s creation of a special unit to guard it, with Defence Minister Mohammad Yaqub expressing his readiness to deploy the army to "support the project with all forces." The canal is seen as a cornerstone for agricultural revitalisation and a key element in the Taliban's bid for political legitimacy.

Projections indicate that by 2050, the water volume in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya basins (Central Asia's two largest water sources) could decrease by 10-15%, which highlights the urgency of this project. In light of the anticipated water deficit, Afghanistan's new authorities have realised that their mountainous nation, despite its poverty, holds significant strategic value as it sits upstream of all regional rivers, thus controlling water flow. Unemployment in Afghanistan remains high, with rapid population growth adding up to half a million new entrants to the labour market annually. Although the canal's completion will not entirely solve this issue, the creation of additional jobs is a critical factor in ensuring domestic political stability. Moreover, the canal's construction is a political statement for the Taliban, demonstrating their ability to undertake large-scale infrastructure projects and thereby legitimising their rule in the eyes of the Afghan population.

The first phase of the project, involving the construction of the initial 108 kilometres, was completed in a year and a half. The inauguration ceremony for this section took place on October 11, 2023, and the Taliban have since commenced the second phase, which will extend the canal by another 65 kilometres. The third phase will involve the creation of a network of agricultural lands in the Faryab, Balkh, and Jowzjan provinces, with the total area of land irrigated by the Amu Darya estimated at 6 million hectares.

However, the benefits of the canal for Afghanistan come at a significant cost to its neighbours. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which rely heavily on the Amu Darya for their agricultural needs, face the prospect of severe water shortages. In Uzbekistan’s Surkhandarya region, farmers are already grappling with reduced water flow, threatening their livelihoods. The canal's primitive construction methods exacerbate these issues, with substantial water losses due to seepage. Environmentalists warn that increased desertification and ecological degradation in the Amu Darya basin are likely outcomes.

The Taliban, unrecognised by any state in the world, are unlikely to limit their actions regarding water management. They have stated that they intend to manage Afghanistan's rivers as they see fit, without seeking external permission.

The canal's extremely primitive construction methods are also a cause for concern. The Qosh Tepa Canal is being dug by excavators directly into the sand, with no concrete reinforcement or waterproofing of the canal bed and banks. Najibullah Sadid, a researcher interviewed by The Economist, suggested that with such methods, water losses will be substantial, as water will seep into the dry sandy soil, increasing consumption and exacerbating the water deficit. A similar construction approach was used for the Karakum Canal in Soviet Turkmenistan, where water losses eventually contributed to the drying up of the Aral Sea. The expansion of agricultural areas in Afghanistan will likely lead to soil salinisation, necessitating the eventual "flushing" of hundreds of thousands of hectares, with the resulting saline water flowing downstream into the Amu Darya.

Currently, the legal regime governing the use of Amu Darya waters is defined by the Almaty Agreement, signed by five post-Soviet countries in 1992. This agreement established a single body for managing the region's water resources—the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC). Afghanistan has never been a part of this agreement. The last time any formal agreement on the legal status of the Amu Darya was reached with Afghanistan was in 1958, under the Soviet Union. Article 16 of that treaty stipulated that "the use of the border river's waters will be regulated by a separate agreement," an issue that has remained unresolved for over half a century due to Afghanistan's negligible water intake and prolonged civil war.

From an international law perspective, treaties between states must be voluntary, and no state can be bound by a treaty without its consent. Thus, the annual water intake limits established by the Almaty Agreement are not binding on Afghanistan. Experts suggest that the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture should be involved in the work of the ICWC, initially as an observer, to help manage the region's water resources more effectively.

The ICWC proposes setting a water intake limit for the Qosh Tepa Canal at 6 cubic kilometres per year, which is 40% lower than its expected capacity of up to 10 cubic kilometres. This 6 cubic kilometre quota should include water intake from rivers flowing into the Pyandzh and Amu Darya from Afghanistan and should be reduced in low-water years. However, it is uncertain whether the Taliban will agree to such restrictions. Regional countries must prepare for the possibility that the Taliban will prioritise their interests over those of their neighbours, as was the case in their recent conflict with Iran.

Iran has a signed 1978 agreement with Afghanistan regarding the waters of the Helmand River, but in the case of the Amu Darya, Kabul has yet to make any commitments to downstream countries. A significant step towards resolving these issues would be a multilateral meeting involving the Taliban-led Afghanistan and the five post-Soviet countries. Although the Taliban have expressed their readiness to address the dispute over the Qosh Tepa Canal diplomatically, there are no signs of a multilateral dialogue emerging.

Amid these water-related tensions, Central Asian countries are significantly boosting their defence budgets. Citing regional instability, potential border conflicts, and global geopolitical shifts, these states are acquiring modern weapons and increasing military spending. While some experts argue that enhanced military capabilities could deter conflict, others fear it might escalate tensions further.

The Qosh Tepa Canal is poised to transform Afghanistan's agricultural sector, potentially reshaping the nation's economic landscape. Businesses related to agriculture, construction, and infrastructure development stand to benefit from increased activity and improved productivity. However, the canal's impact extends beyond Afghanistan's borders. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, reduced water availability could lead to increased costs for agricultural businesses, diminishing output, and threatening economic stability. The future of businesses in these regions will hinge on their ability to adapt to new water dynamics, implement water-saving technologies, and navigate the complex interplay of regional politics and environmental change.